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Portugal started its economic and financial integration process in 1960,
when it became one of the founding countries of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA). Since then, significant structural changes have occur-
red, the economic integration process has deepened and the economy has
achieved substantial nominal and real convergence to EU levels. Through-
out the last four decades, despite important internal and external economic
shocks, thepath towards economic and monetary integration has been main-
tained and the economy has witnessed important changes in terms of trade 
partners, trade structure, structure of production and general macroecono-
mic environment. The economic and financial integration process is still un-
derway but a major milestone was attained in 1999 with the participation
in the group of countries that initiated the European Monetary Union
(EMU). The relative success of the economic and financial integration pro-
cess lies in a gradualist strategy and clearly defined objectives back-ed by
a broad national consensus. In addition, the integration in the EU worked
as a catalyst for economic reforms that would have otherwise taken longer
to materialize.
The aim of this paper is to take a critical overview of the Portuguese ex-
perience since the sixties, with particular emphasis on the process of eco-
nomic and financial integration with the EU. Such analysis allows us to
identify the sequence of reforms, the obstacles posed by demand and supply 
shocks and to broadly evaluate the options that were made. This is a use-
ful exercise both for Portuguese and foreign economic policy-makers, espe-
cially those of the Central and Eastern European countries, which are about
to join the EU. First, to face the challenges ahead for the Portuguese eco-
nomy it is necessary to focus on the areas where success was minor. Second,
for countries about to enter the EU, which will probably face the same di-
lemmas experienced by Portugal, it is useful to assess past experiences.
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disclaimers apply.The paper is organized chronologically. In the next section we present
the steps towards economic integration that were taken prior to EU acces-
sion in 1986. In section 3 we discuss the negotiation and the motivations
for EU accession. In section 4, we analyse the period between 1986 and
1992, which coincided with the transitional phase negotiated by Portugue-
se authorities to adopt the EU trade regulations. Next, in section 5, we look
at the so-called nominal convergence period, which laid the macroeconomic
background that allowed EMU qualification in 1998 and the adoption of
the euro in 1999. Section 6 discusses the present situation and identifies
the challenges that lie ahead for the Portuguese economy. Finally, in sec-
tion 7 we present some concluding remarks.
2. Before EU Entry
In 1960 Portugal was still a fairly closed economy and a closed society.
Anon-democratic regime had been ruling the country for already more than
three decades, the manufacturing sector was underdeveloped, uncompeti-
tive and protected from foreign competition and the trade flows were small
relatively to the size of the economy (Figure 1).
The structure of production was based on manufacturing industry and
services, agriculture still retained an important share of total employment
and the price of the production factors was under the close control of the eco-
nomic authorities. Therefore, interest rates, inflation and unemployment
were low (Figure 2), to which also contributed the strong emigration flows
to some European countries. The trade balance ran chronic deficits, partly
due to the Portuguese external dependence on energy and food products. In
addition, although the colonial war dragged on through the sixties, the bud-
get deficits were kept mostly at below 2 percent of GDP.
The decision to enter the EFTAwas based on political and economical mo-
tivations. On economic grounds, the participation in a free trade zone like
the EFTA was expected to initiate an export-lead industrialization process,
contrasting with theimport-substitution industrialization strategy that had
been tried during the fifties and which had failed.
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FIGURE 1 Degree of Openness (constant prices of 1995)
Source: AMECO415
(continued)
FIGURE 2 Main Macroeconomic Indicators in PortugalAs the classic trade theory models predict, the engagement in free trade
leads countries to specialize in the production of the goods where they have
comparative advantage, which are typically those that intensively use
theproduction factors relatively abundant in thecountry. Portugal was are-
latively labour abundant country so it had comparative advantage in la-
bour intensive goods. Indeed, during the sixties, the textiles, clothing and
footwear industries strongly developed, benefiting from exports to theEFTA
markets and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Until the present, 
these industries have kept their export-oriented nature and remain a rela-
tively important share of total exports (38 and 25 percent of merchandise
exports in 1990 and 2000, respectively). In addition, the participation in
the EFTAplayed an important role in establishing the know-how for the in-
ternationalisation of other industries. This strongly contributed to thesharp
convergence of the GDP per capita to the European average witnessed du-
ring the sixties (Figure 3).
It is important to remark that, at this time, theoption for entering theEEC
instead of theEFTAdid not exist. In fact, thenon-democratic nature of there-
gime made it politically impossible. Furthermore, on economic grounds, gi-
ven the structure of the Portuguese economy, entry into the EEC at this time
would have probably been a too ambitious challenge.
Throughout the sixties, Portugal witnessed a strong emigration flow to
certain European countries – representing cumulatively more than 10 per-
cent of the population – which had important effects on the economy. First,
it gave rise to substantial private unilateral transfers, which contributed
to balance thecurrent account. Second, such transfers increased households’
savings and ignited the development of the banking system, through the ex-
pansion of bank branches out of the main cities. Third, the strong emigra-
tion, together with the colonial war, put a strain on the labour market, con-
tributing to mounting wage and inflation pressures in the early seventies
– see also (Sousa, 1995).
The beginning of the seventies brought about dramatic negative supply 
shocks to the Portuguese economy. The first negative supply shock occur-
red in 1973 with the sharp increase in oil prices. The first oil shock and
the world recession that followed obviously had a severe negative impact
on a small open economy like the Portuguese, much dependent on im-
ported energy goods. In fact, the terms of trade sharply deteriorated and
foreign demand reduced, negatively affecting the current account (Fi-
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FIGURE 2 Main Macroeconomic Indicators in Portugal (continued)
Source: Banco de Portugal and INEgure 2). In addition, the inflation rate almost tripled from 1973 to 1974,
reaching 28 percent. The second negative supply shock occurred in
1974–75, after the Portuguese revolution, which established democracy.
In fact, the massive nationalization process in 1975 disrupted the ma-
nagement of firms, leading to loss of clients and decreasing profits. In ad-
dition, the unrealistically high nominal and real wage updates boosted
unit labour costs and inflation. Then, owing to the existing instability
and uncertainty, the transfers from emigrants sharply decreased and do-
mestic capitals flew abroad. Finally, contrasting with the situation prior
to 1974, the fiscal policy adopted a clearly expansionary stance (the ge-
neral government deficit increased about 7 percentage points (p.p.) of
GDP from 1973 to 1976). Despite these changes, the monetary policy re-
mained unaltered with low administratively fixed interest rates and a re-
latively stable exchange rate against most European currencies. Thethird 
negative supply shock was the massive return of Portuguese nationals li-
ving in the former colonies, which abruptly increased the labour force and
public expenditure. As a consequence of the three negative supply shocks,
whose effects were mutually reinforced, and despite the political stabi-
lization after 1976, serious macroeconomic imbalances mounted and
the economy entered a phase of macroeconomic turbulence that lasted
until 1985 – see also (Lopes, 1999).
Amongst the different macroeconomic imbalances, the current account
deficit soon emerged as the most serious. The high inflation rates accom-
panied by stable nominal exchange rates implied real exchange rate ap-
preciations and reduced export competitiveness. In addition, the internati-
onal recession, the deterioration in the terms of trade (due to the first oil
shock), the sharp decrease in tourism revenues and the drop in transfers
from emigrants set the framework for a current account crisis.
The current account imbalance was initially financed with foreign reser-
ves but at the beginning of 1977 it became clear that the economy was on
an unsustainable path and the monetary policy would have to change. Du-
ring 1977 the Portuguese authorities adopted some corrective measures,
namely increases in interest rates (first a 1.5 p.p. increase followed by an-
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FIGURE 3 GDP per capita as a Percentage of EU-15 (PPP corrected)
Source: AMECOother hike of 5 p.p.) and devaluations of the currency (first a spot devalua-
tion of 15 percent and then the adoption of a crawling-peg with a monthly
effective rate of depreciation of 1 percent). However, due to the usual lags
(J-curve effect) these measures did not produce immediate results and
the Portuguese government called for an economic stabilization agreement
with the IMF. The economic stabilization agreement with the IMF worked
in 1978–79 and was based on conventional expenditure-reducing and ex-
penditure-switching policies.1 This stabilization programme was successful
since it corrected the foreign account imbalance without imposing a strong
burden on economic growth. Nevertheless, the inflation rate remained high,
fuelled by the continuing crawling-peg. The perceived success of the pro-
gramme benefited from the expansion in the world economy, from the re-
newed entry of transfers from emigrants and from the lagged effects of
the measures taken back in 1977 – see also (Pinto, 1983).
In 1980 the Portuguese authorities adopted measures aiming at re-
ducing inflation and accelerating economic activity. In order to reduce
inflation, there was a 6 percent spot revaluation of the currency (after
which the crawling-peg was maintained but at a lower rate). In addi-
tion, in order to expand aggregate demand, private investment was pro-
moted and there were higher wage increases, which expanded disposable
income and private consumption. However, these measures were taken
against a background of international crisis, following the second oil
shock of 1979. Therefore, the counter-cyclical expansionary stance of
the Portuguese economic policy, together with the deterioration in
the terms of trade, brought about a new deterioration of the current
account. The current account crisis worsened in 1981–82 as the postpo-
nement of unpopular restrictive measures was accompanied by raising
external indebtedness, and it became unsustainable when foreign cre-
dit stopped and authorities were unable to finance the increasing bor-
rowing requirements. In this context, the Portuguese authorities were
forced to call again for aneconomic stabilization agreement with theIMF.
The second stabilization agreement with the IMF (1983–84) relied 
mostly on expenditure-reducing policies, so it was much harder than
the first. This was perceived as necessary because the initial external
and domestic conditions were less favourable and the external debt had
grown in the meantime (from about 35 percent of GDP in 1979 to 90 per-
cent in 1984). As a consequence, the real GDP growth rate was negative 
in 1984 and the unemployment rate rose substantially (by 2.5 p.p. be-
tween 1982 and 1985).
From 1974 until 1984 Portugal experienced a typical period of “stop-and-
-go”, where the domestic savings (both private and public) were not suffici-
ent to finance the investment needs associated with the catching-up pro-
cess. As a result, a current account crisis emerged owing to the econo-
my’s financing needs. It is important to mention that the crisis broadly
resulted from the high public sector financing needs, illustrating a typical
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1 The expenditure-reducing policies comprised increases in interest rates, limits on do-
mestic credit growth, cuts in government spending and low (negative) real wage increa-
ses. The expenditure-switching policies consisted of currency devaluations.situation of “twin deficits”. Nevertheless, the correction of the imbalances
relied mostly on reductions in private domestic expenditure, which limited
private investment and potential GDP growth (Figure 4).
3. Negotiating EEC Accession and Its Motivations
Portugal applied for EEC membership in March 1977. Negotiations for
accession began in October 1978 and ended in June 1985 with the signa-
ture of the accession treaty. Nevertheless, the root of the Portuguese pro-
cess of approach to the EEC can be traced further back in time with the sig-
nature of a preferential trade agreement in 1972. Apart from the normal
complexity of the accession process, the reasons for the lengthy negotiation 
period lay on the serious macroeconomic imbalances that affected the Por-
tuguese economy during these years, whose solution became a priority for
policy-makers, and on the EEC’s decision to make Portugal and Spain join
simultaneously. In fact, Portugal unsuccessfully tried to decouple accession 
negotiations from those of Spain, whose larger economy made the negotia-
tions more difficult, especially in the areas of agriculture and fisheries – see
also (Royo, 2002).
The motivations for EEC accession were threefold – political, strategic
and economic. On political grounds, the Portuguese accession to the EEC
sought to strengthen the young democratic process. On strategic grounds,
as a small peripheral country, Portugal must rely on broader markets to
sustain economic growth and on multinational organizations to have some
influence on international issues. In fact, the decolonisation process, which
occurred after the 1974 revolution, eliminated most of the links with Africa 
and definitively turned European integration into a national long-term ob-
jective. On economic grounds, EEC membership implied a higher degree of
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FIGURE 4 Savings and Investment – General Government and Private Sector (inc.public firms)
Source: Banco de Portugal and INEopenness, generating higher gains of trade (Figure 1). In addition, the Eu-
ropean Structural Funds made it possible for the economy to maintain pri-
vate and public investment at higher levels without incurring in unsustain-
able foreign account imbalances. Finally, EEC membership induced 
the adoption of micro and macroeconomic reforms that would otherwise
have taken longer to occur. The accession process, as well as the subse-
quent steps in the process of economic and financial integration, benefited
from a very strong national consensus, backed by the approval of the ma-
jor political parties.
4. The Transitional Period and the Single Market
The transitional period that was negotiated for the Portuguese sectors to
phase out internal trade barriers, to adopt the common EEC trade policy
and to implement common technical, health and safety standards was set
to last until the end of 1992.2 Then, Portugal would fully integrate the star-
ting European Single Market. Throughout the transitional period Portugal
benefited from theEuropean Structural Funds, aiming to modernize theeco-
nomy through increases in physical and human capital. After accession in
1986, specific programmes for industrial and agricultural development
(PEDIP and PEDAP) were launched. The reform of the European Structu-
ral Funds in 1988 integrated the existing specific programmes and made
the whole territory of Portugal eligible for Objective 1 assistance, raising
funds received from the EEC from 1.6 percent of GDP in 1988 to an ave-
rage of 2.35 percent for the period 1989–93.
During the transitional period, Portugal implemented important struc-
tural reforms with far-reaching effects on economic growth. First, arising
from the catalyst effect of EEC membership, there was a reform of taxation 
with the introduction of the VAT in 1986 and the introduction of new per-
sonal and corporate income taxes in 1989. The new taxes were more effi-
cient, collecting higher revenues with lower marginal tax rates, thus redu-
cing distortions. In addition, the new taxes reduced evasion and shortened
tax payment lags.
Second, important structural reforms occurred in the financial system.
These reforms comprised theauthorization for private banks and new non-
-monetary financial institutions to operate and the gradual liberalization
of capital flows with the EEC, which was fully accomplished by the end
of 1992, when the European Single Market was initiated. In addition, in
1990 the new Organic Law of the Bank of Portugal was approved. This
gave greater independence to the central bank in the formulation and im-
plementation of the monetary policy and the principle that it could not
grant credit to the public sector was accepted and gradually implemen-
ted until 1992.
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2 The exceptions were certain agricultural sub-sectors which, given their weaknesses, were
supposed to adjust to theAgricultural Common Policy regulations by the end of 1995. How-
ever, as a counterpart to additional financial support, the adjustment process of these ag-
ricultural sub-sectors was later anticipated to last until the end of 1992.Third, after the revision of the Constitution in 1989, Portugal embarked
on a substantial privatisation programme, which continues until the pre-
sent, although it almost stalled since 2000 due to adverse capital market
conditions. Following the massive nationalizations in 1975, public owner-
ship in the market sector in 1988 accounted for close to 19 percent of total
value added, 6.5 percent of employment and 15 percent of total investment.
The state-owned companies dominated some of the most important sectors
such as banking, insurance, cement, transport, communications, energy and
pulp, and were sheltered from competition. As a result, these companies
were generally inefficient and ran losses.
The Portuguese privatisation programme broadly comprised three pha-
ses. In the first phase the privatisation of state-owned banks and insurance 
companies represented the largest share of the programme. This was partly 
due to the specific point of departure, as these sectors had been massively
affected by the nationalization process in 1975 and were almost entirely
publicly owned.3 Then, in the mid nineties, privatisations were centred on
manufacturing sectors – cement, oil and pulp. Finally, in the late nineties,
the privatisation programme centred on the large telecommunications and
energy monopolies. Theprivatisation sequence, initiated in the banking and
insurance sectors, enhanced the rapid liberalization of the financial sector
in the first half of the nineties. Such modernization and the higher liqui-
dity of the Portuguese capital markets facilitated the next privatisations.
The privatisation of the large telecommunications and energy monopolies
was left for the last stage because it required the establishment of regula-
tory authorities.
The gains of the privatisation process were visible both at the micro and
macroeconomic levels. At the microeconomic level, privatisations increased
competition and efficiency in the productive sector, leading to lower prices
and higher output. At the macroeconomic level, privatisations represented
a positive aggregate supply shock. In addition, according to the 1990 pri-
vatisation law, the proceeds from the sale of state-owned companies – which
represented on average about 2 percent of GDP in the period from 1989 to
2001 – had to be used to redeem public debt or to make capital injections
to other state-owned companies (see also Ministério das Finanças, 1995 and
1999). The breakdown of the proceeds to these ends was uneven throughout
the process, taking the redemption of public debt an average share of about
49 percent in the period 1989–2001.
The use of privatisation proceeds to redeem public debt had a lasting ef-
fect on the general government deficit because it implied interest savings.
The capital injections to state-owned companies were intended to facilitate 
the restructuring of those companies, some of them for future privatisation. 
However, they were often a means of reducing the compensatory payments
due to public companies for their social activity, which would have other-
wise increased the deficit. Therefore, both uses of privatisation proceeds led
to reductions of public debt. Nevertheless, capital injections reduced the vi-
sibility of inefficiencies and the incentives to implement reforms in the state-
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3 At the beginning of 1989, around 80 percent of the financial sector was publicly owned,
compared with about 15 percent in the manufacturing sector.-owned companies. In this sense, it would have been preferable to use all
privatisation proceeds to the redemption of public debt.
Two additional structural phenomena occurred in theyears following EEC
membership, namely significant changes in the structure of international
trade and higher FDI inflows. The degree of openness of the Portuguese
economy increased, the share of intra-EU merchandise exports increased
from about 75 percent in 1986 to about 80 percent in 1992 and the share of
intra EU-merchandise imports increased from about 62 percent to about
77 percent in the same period. This phenomenon was particularly signifi-
cant relatively to Spain whose weight in the overall Portuguese merchan-
dise exports and imports increased from 1986 to 1992 by 8.2 and 5.7 p.p.,
respectively.4As for the trade pattern, the share of machinery and transport
material in merchandise exports increased respectively by 8.7 and 10.1 p.p.
from 1986 to 2000, while the share of clothing and footwear declined by
10.5 p.p. The change in the structure of merchandise exports was partly ex-
plained by the FDI inflows that followed EEC accession (Figure 5).
Such FDI inflows were due to comparatively lower wages in Portugal, ex-
pectations of high productivity gains and a higher credibility of the macro-
economic policy due to EEC membership. However, this process did not con-
tinue in the most recent years. The reduction of FDI inflows might be
the result of rising relative unit labour costs and increased competition from
Central and Eastern European countries. Simultaneously, the outward FDI
flows have increased as some Portuguese companies have invested abroad
in an effort to internationalise their activity and take advantage of better
financing conditions.
Although very important, EEC membership was not the only positive
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4 The weight of Spain in the overall merchandise exports and imports increased from 1986
to 2001 by 13.6 and 17.2 p.p., respectively.
FIGURE 5 Direct Investment
Note: From 1996 onwards, direct investment flows include the item reinvested earnings and, therefore, are not
exactly comparable with data from previous years.
Source: Banco de Portugalsupply shock affecting the Portuguese economy in this period. As a matter
of fact, the sharp decrease in oil prices that occurred in 1986 represented
a gain in the terms of trade and implied substantial savings in oil imports
(about 2.4 percent of GDP in 1986). In addition, the devaluation of the dol-
lar and the decrease in the international interest rates had a positive im-
pact in reducing the burden of external debt. In fact, the implicit interest
rate on the Portuguese external debt decreased from 8.8 percent in 1985 to
7.4 percent in 1986 and the interest payments declined by 2.3 p.p. of GDP.
5. The Nominal Convergence Period: 1990–1997
In 1989, after some years of significant real GDP growth accompanied by
decreasing inflation rates and moderate current account deficits, the infla-
tion rate increased (Figure 2). This slippage in inflation was the result of
several factors. First, thepositive effects of thesupply shocks that had occur-
red in the mid-eighties had ceased. Second, the buoyant behaviour of do-
mestic demand overheated the economy. Consequently, the unemployment
rate decreased and trade unions demanded higher wage updates. The in-
flation rate increase was mostly determined by the behaviour of prices on
the nontradable sector. In fact, despite maintaining the crawling-peg re-
gime, the monetary authorities did not accommodate the higher inflation
differential, stabilizing prices on the tradable sector.
By 1990 the Portuguese economy was facing the challenge of accelera-
ting the pace of nominal convergence with the EU as the project of the fu-
ture EMU was being drafted. The participation in the group of countries
that would found the EMU was clearly assumed as a national objective
and the economic policy was managed accordingly. Aiming at reverting in-
flation into a downward trend, the Portuguese authorities took important
steps. In October 1990 the crawling-peg regime was abandoned in favour
of a regime where the escudo mimicked the behaviour of the basket of cur-
rencies taking part in the exchange rate mechanism of the European Mo-
netary System (EMS) – an EMS shadowing regime – and the central bank
broadly adopted a principle of nominal stability. This change in regime in-
creased thecredibility of thenon-accommodating disinflation strategy with
an important impact on the reduction of inflation expectations. In addi-
tion, the new stability regime would prepare the entry of the escudo to
the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, a requirement for accession to
the EMU.
The adoption of the new exchange rate regime moved together with chan-
ges in the way the monetary authority conducted its operations. The mo-
netary authority switched from direct to indirect control of interest rates,
based on openmarket operations. In order to conduct the open market in-
terventions in a more liquid market, new public bonds were issued and
bought by banks. Such operations withdrew the excess liquidity lying in
the banking system due to the existence of credit ceilings5, which posed a threat
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5 The compulsory credit-ceiling regime was eliminated in March 1990 and replaced by guide-
lines regarding the growth of credit. The abolition of the credit guidelines occurred at
the beginning of 1991.to monetary policy. However, the change in the exchange rate regime ma-
intained a monetary policy dilemma that was present after some time. In
fact, the exchange rate’s predictability and stability, together with domes-
tic interest rates higher than those abroad, led to significant capital inflows,
making it hard to manage domestic liquidity and endangering the disin-
flation efforts. In the same way, lower domestic interest rates would dis-
courage short run capital inflows but would risk giving an expansionary
stance to domestic demand. In order to solve this dilemma some barriers to
international capital movements were temporarily reintroduced.
Another important component of the disinflation effort was based on chan-
ges in the wage bargaining process. From 1990 onwards, the authorities suc-
cessfully detached wage updates from the previous year’sinflation and cent-
red instead on the next year’s expected inflation. Simultaneously, by high-
lighting the inflation reductions, the authorities succeeded in lowering in-
flation expectations.
In April1992 theescudo entered theexchange rate mechanism of theEMS,
which was a proven inflation stability area (Kocenda – Papell, 1997).
The entry into the EMS (to the 6 percent fluctuation band) fuelled a lively
debate among Portuguese economists. On the one hand, such entry would
clearly boost the credibility and the efficiency of the anti-inflationary policy 
and would represent a significant step in the process of economic integra-
tion. On the other hand, if the inflation in the nontradable sector remained
resilient, additional real exchange rate appreciations would put the profit
margins of exporters under serious pressure, so there would be the risk of
a recession. The real exchange rate appreciation that actually occurred be-
tween 1989 and 1992 was relatively benign. In fact, part of the apprecia-
tion was the adjustment of the exchange rate to a new equilibrium, which
is a phenomenon usually associated with a real convergence process (Ba-
lassa, 1964), (Abreu, 2001). In addition, the expansionary stance of fiscal
policy in this period, while contributing to the real appreciation, sustained
the growth of domestic demand.
In December 1992 the EMS was struck by a serious crisis, which led to
the broadening of the currency bands to 15 percent. In this context and un-
til the adoption of the euro, the escudo realigned its central parity three 
times (6.0 percent in November 1992, 6.5 percent in May 1993 and 3.5 per-
cent in March 1995), partially accompanying the realignments of the Spa-
nish peseta and not jeopardizing the nominal convergence process.
The nominal convergence criteria established in the Maastricht Treaty
for accession to the monetary union were a vital benchmark for Portuguese 
policy-makers. By 1993, the exchange rate, inflation and interest rates were
moving along a favourable path. The 1993 recession and the increase in
unemployment facilitated further reductions in the inflation and interest
rates. However, the public finance criteria represented a more demanding
challenge. In 1993 the general government deficit stood at 6.1 percent of
GDP, having increased 3.1 p.p. from 1992.6 Such deterioration was due to
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6 General government figures published in the EMI Convergence Report of 1998. Taking
the ESA95 criteria, the general government deficits amounted to 4.8 and 8.1 percent of
GDP in 1992 and 1993, respectively.the effect of the automatic stabilizers in a period of recession, the difficulty 
of the tax system to adapt to the Single Market regulations, which implied
a temporary loss of revenue, and some discretionary measures (Cunha –
Neves, 1995).
Throughout the years until 1997, upon whose data the decision of EMU
accession would be based, the fulfilment of the public finance criteria be-
came a priority. The reduction of the general government deficit strongly
benefited from the substantial reduction in interest payments (from 7.2 p.p.
of GDP in 1990 to 4.3 p.p. of GDP in 1997), mainly due to the lower impli-
cit interest rates. In addition, moderate public wage updates and discreti-
onary measures concerning the pension system allowed some containment
of current primary expenditure growth. Finally, the improvement of the cy-
clical position of theeconomy also had apositive effect on thedeficit. Thecon-
tinuation of this consolidation process after EMU accession, in a context of
full convergence of interest rates and with no further significant savings on
interest payments, would require continued public expenditure control,
which did not occur.
6. Where Do We Stand Today? The EMU and the Challenges
Ahead
The adoption of the euro as the national currency in 1999 represented
a major success for Portugal. In fact, at the beginning of the nineties such
an achievement would have raised serious doubts. The clear definition 
of objectives, which were widely shared by theeconomic agents, and thepur-
suit of consistent macroeconomic policies, were important factors of suc-
cess. However, after 1997 important macroeconomic imbalances emerged
in the Portuguese economy. Such imbalances consisted of high financing 
needs of the private sector, relatively high general government deficits and,
consequently, high current plus capital account deficits (Figure 2). It is very
useful to identify the underlying causes of this new macroeconomic situa-
tion.
The entry into a monetary union stands as a permanent structural shock
to the economy, changing the stationary equilibrium levels of the macro-
economic aggregates, namely the current plus capital account deficits. There 
are two main channels through which relatively poorer countries may ex-
perience higher current plus capital account deficits during an economic
and financial integration process. The first channel is through higher do-
mestic total factor productivity and increased growth prospects, resulting
from higher market competition and efficiency. In this case, there is higher
investment, due to a higher marginal productivity of capital, and higher
consumption, due to the anticipation of higher disposable income flows.
The second channel works through financial market integration, which –
coupled with the monetary union – reduces the cost of capital and elimi-
nates currency risk. In this case, thedecrease in interest rate lowers thecost
of borrowing and eases liquidity constraints, leading to substantial lower
savings, higher consumption and higher investment. The second channel
seems to have been prevalent in Portugal in the second half of the nineties.
425The decreasing interest rates and prospects of higher income led Portu-
guese households to increase consumption and investment, mostly in hous-
ing. The significant investment in housing was financed by domestic bank
credit, which in turn recurred to external borrowing. The investment in
housing contributed to a boom in the construction sector and to a rise in
real estate prices (average growth rate of about 7 percent between 1998 and
2000). Such strong demand for new houses was the result of a clearly un-
derdeveloped rental market7, of households’preferences and of potential ca-
pital gains in a context of rising real estate prices and decreasing rates of
return for other savings applications. Furthermore, the decreasing interest
rates led to higher investment by Portuguese firms. The buoyant behavi-
our of private consumption and investment was accentuated by the pro-cyc-
lical stance of fiscal policy, as measured by decreasing cyclically adjusted
primary balances. In this context, the high growth rates of domestic de-
mand, especially of its aggregates with higher import content, and the dis-
appointing behaviour of the Portuguese exports of goods, which lost mar-
ket share to emerging and Eastern European economies, led to a clear
deterioration of the current plus capital account deficit, reaching a height
of 8.9 percent of GDP in 2000.
From what was described above it comes clear that, contrary to the pe-
riod 1974 to 1984, the recent foreign account imbalance was mostly the re-
sult of higher private sector financing needs (Figure 4).
Since the second half of 2000 the Portuguese economy is experiencing
an adjustment process, which is expected to continue in the next years.
The existing expectations about higher productivity growth and higher su-
stainable disposable income did not entirely materialize due to unsolved
structural problems. In addition, despite the lowering interest rates,
the strong increase in indebtedness increased the total burden of debt. As
a result, private agents feel the need to readjust their balance sheets.
The adjustment process of the Portuguese economy is visible in a lower
contribution of private consumption and investment to GDP growth. In
the same way, after reaching a general government deficit of 4.2 percent
of GDP in 2001, clearly above the 3 percent reference value established by
the Stability and Growth Pact, the fiscal policy must definitively turn to
a tightening stance. Therefore, at present, the economy is witnessing 
a lower contribution of domestic demand to economic growth, which has
not been totally compensated by an increase in net external demand. As
a result of the adjustment process (and also the normal effects of the world
economy on the Portuguese business cycle), the GDP growth rates are low,
the savings rate has been increasing – mostly associated with the financ-
ing of debt interest and repayments – and the current plus capital account
deficit has been decreasing from the very high levels attained in 1999–2000
(Figure 2).
Although in a quite different context, the booming years after EMU acces-
sion and the present adjustment process, characterized by a period of pro-
tracted low growth with low investment, somewhat resemble a “stop-and-
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7 Affected by rent freezes though large periods of the twentieth century. Only in 1985 did
new leases start to reflect market rents.-go” situation like the ones Portugal has experienced in the past. The par-
ticipation in the EMU rules out the occurrence of a currency crisis. How-
ever, the existing low factor productivity hampers the ability of the economy 
to finance domestic demand without running important current plus capi-
tal account imbalances.
The Portuguese productivity level converged to the EU average at a re-
latively slow pace, meaning that economic growth has mostly benefited from
higher factor endowments, namely a higher capital stock and a higher la-
bour market participation rate (Table 1).
The full explanation for the insufficient productivity growth is not easy
to obtain and the required policies in this area take time to produce re-
sults. Low labour force average qualification, small average size and lack
of entre-preneurship of firms and regulatory induced distortions are
amongst the most cited problems. Therefore, the policy responses must fo-
cus on fast-er and generalized human capital accumulation, higher in-
vestment in machinery and equipment, which embodies new technologies,
competitive tax structures and improved management methods and atti-
tudes – see also (Fortin, 2002). The efficient utilization of the European
Structural Funds is also a much-debated issue, especially in the case of
comparatively poorer countries like Portugal. In this respect Portugal re-
gistered success in improving its infrastructure but as far as professional
training and industrial modernization are concerned the results are ques-
tionable.
7. Final Remarks 
The path of the Portuguese economy towards monetary and economic in-
tegration has been relatively successful. This is visible through the real and
nominal convergence to the EU average. Nevertheless, there are lessons to
be drawn and important challenges lie ahead. The main lessons are that
trade liberalization and market competition, as existing in the EU, are im-
portant drivers in real convergence and the existence of clear and politi-
cally assumed macroeconomic objectives facilitates nominal convergence.
Furthermore, nominal convergence does not ensure by itself a sustained
output growth. As the standard economic theory underlines, sustained out-
put growth must rely on supply-side policies that increase total factor pro-
ductivity, to be implemented preferably in periods of economic expansion in
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TABLE 1 Supply Side Indicators
Source: AMECO
1961–73 1974–85 1986–90 1991–95 1996–2002
Growth of net capital stock (real) 2.7 4.7 3.7 3.4 4.1
Net capital/output ratio (real) 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Growth of capital intensity 2.4 5.1 2.6 4.0 2.5
Labour productivity growth 6.6 2.6 4.6 2.3 1.5
Total factor productivity growth 5.8 1.0 3.7 1.0 0.7
Memo: EU-15 total factor productivity growth 3.0 1.0 1.5 1.1 0.8order to mitigate the adjustment costs. Therefore, the challenge for the Por-
tuguese economy is to accelerate such liberalization and productivity-pro-
moting supply-side policies, while avoiding an excessive growth of domes-
tic demand. This will make the economy fitter to accommodate to adverse
internal or external shocks. Otherwise, macroeconomic imbalances will
eventually re-emerge and a period of protracted low growth will then be re-
quired to correct them.
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The Path towards Economic and Monetary
Integration: The Portuguese Experience
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(jamador@bportugal.pt)
The Portuguese economy initiated its path towards economic and monetary inte-
gration in 1960 by taking part in the group of countries that founded the European
Free Trade Association. Since then until the adoption of the euro as the national
currency in 1999 a long path was followed. The economic and financial integration
process has been successful and benefited from the support of a large majority of
domestic agents. Along this path the country witnessed substantial real and nomi-
nal convergence to the European Union average. However, Portugal is still lagging
behind and important challenges lie ahead. Economic and financial integration in
the EU was a catalyst for needed economic reforms, it increased the degree of open-
ness and the gains from trade and facilitated nominal convergence through clearly
defined and politically assumed macroeconomic objectives. Nevertheless, as the re-
cent years in Portugal illustrate, financial and monetary integration do not gua-
rantee sustainable economic growth nor avoid macroeconomic imbalances. Only con-
tinued increases in total factor productivity based on effective supply-side policies
can deliver these results.
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